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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
No. 90-7099 
District Court Civil Action No. 84-3040 
ANN B. HOPKINS, 
V. 
PRICE WATERHOUSE, 
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, 
RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES 
Appellee, 
Appellant. 
A. Parties And Amici 
The following parties appeared in this matter m the 
District Court below: 
1. Price Waterhouse, a partnership. 
2. Ann B. Hopkins. 
The above-listed parties are parties to this action on 
appeal. There were no intervenors or amici in the court 
below. 
B. Rulings Under Review 
The rulings under review in this appeal are contained 
in the Remedial Order and Final Judgment of the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia entered 
on May 25, 1990 by District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell, 
which is unreported and reproduced in the Appendix, at 
252-53, and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on Remand and accompanying Order entered by Judge 
Gesell on May 14, 1990, which also are unreported and 
reproduced in the Appendix, at 218-51. 
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C. Related Cases 
This case was previously before this Court in Hopkins 
v. Price Waterhouse, Nos. 85-6052 & 85-6097 (consoli-
dated). This Court's August 4, 1987 opinion is reported at 
825 F.2d 458. The District Court's 1985 Memorandum and 
Order in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 84-3040 are 
reported at 618 F. Supp. 1109. This case also was before 
the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of 
certiorari, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, No. 87-1167, and 
the Supreme Court's May 1, 1989 decision is reported at 
109 S. Ct. 1775. 
A related case brought by plaintiff under the District 
of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code § 1-2501, et. 
seq., is pending in the Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia (Civ. Division), styled Hopkins v. Price Water-
house, No. 3469-84. 
( • • f 
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
PERTINENT STATUTES 
The pertinent provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., are 
reproduced in the Addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erroneously concluded that 
Price Waterhouse failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that it would have postponed for one year a decision regarding plaintiff's partnership candidacy re-
gardless of her sex. 
2. Whether the District Court was required by the law 
of the case doctrine to determine that plaintiff was con-
structively discharged by Price Waterhouse when she was not reproposed for partner notwithstanding its finding that 
plaintiff's own intentional unreasonable conduct had itself 
removed any possibility that she would be reproposed. 
3. Whether the courts are authorized to compel the cre-
ation of a professional partnership as a remedy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
4. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in 
ordering Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner un-
der the circumstances of this case. 
5. Whether, even if Price Waterhouse is liable to plaintiff 
under Title VII, plaintiff is entitled to any damages in 
light of her own unreasonable conduct that prevented her 
from becoming a Price Waterhouse partner and her failure 
to seek comparable employment elsewhere. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 




' ~ . 
k\" ~"" 
t· ·· · 
i 
L. · 
~::' ,·- · 









\ -,;~ .. -
., , :,· 
.,, -•«· .• 
__ °" ._, .,,,,_.;;: - . , .. :; 
,• L .C 
.. . <:3.~; 
T ,-~~.: .. ,. __ ~~ .. 
·: ,_,..,.,- .. 





·' tJ •. 
. .. .. . , ... . ~ ·- - ·-- _.,.,,.. .. 
- ,. . _.,. • .-:::.t .. _~f •. ·-· ... -·'~- ·I) , 
.• ., - -- -•~ · .... ~·-;._-- ·· ~ ; .. :--'., •• "-4 - • 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Procedural History 
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Defendant 
Price Waterhouse is a national professional partnership 
engaged in accounting, auditing, tax, and management 
consulting. Plaintiff Ann B. Hopkins was a Price Water-house employee whose 1982-83 candidacy for partnership 
in the firm was deferred for further consideration the fol-
lowing year. She was not reproposed the following year 
and subsequently resigned from the firm. She contends 
that the 1983 deferral of her candidacy was influenced by considerations of sex. She filed this action seeking admis-
sion to the partnership, back pay and attorney's fees. 
After a nonjury trial in 1985, Hopkins v. Price Water-
house, 618 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), the Di~rict Court found that plaintiff had problems with her "interpersonal 
skills" that provided a legitimate, nonpretextual basis for 
deferring plaintiff's partnership candidacy " 'to afford time 
to demonstrate that she has the personal and leadership 
qualities required of a partner.' " Id. at 1113. The court also found, however, that Price Waterhouse had permitted 
an unquantified level of "unconscious" sexual stereotyping 
to play an "undefined role" in its partner selection process. 
Id. at 1118. The court held that "once a plaintiff proves 
that sex discrimination played a role in the employment decision, the plaintiff is entitled to relief unless the em-
ployer has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence 
that the decision would have been the same absent dis-
crimination .... Price Waterhouse has not done so.'' Id. 
at 1120 ( citations omitted). 
The District Court found that although a flawed process 
may have contributed to the initial decision to defer 
plaintiff's partnership candidacy, the decision not to re-
propose her for partner the following year was not dis-
criminatory. 618 F. Supp. at 1114-15. It also found that her subsequent resignation from the firm was voluntary 
and did not constitute a constructive discharge. Id. at 1121. 
3 
Because she had not been constructively discharged, the 
District Court determined that plaintiff was "not entitled 
to an order that she be made partner" or "to any mon-
etary relief for the period subsequent to her resignation." 
Id. at 1121. 
Both parties appealed. In August 1987, a divided panel 
of this Court affirmed the District Court's decision as to 
liability. The Court held that 
bdth plaintiffs personality and the sexually stereo-
typed reactions to her personality were significant fac-
tors in the firm's decision to hold her candidacy. 
Because Price Waterhouse could not demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that h:npermissible bias 
was not the determinative factor, however, the Dis-
trict Court properly found for Hopkins on the question 
of liability. 
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 471-72 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987).1 
Plaintiff had not appealed and the Court of Appeals did 
not disturb the District Court's conclusion that Price 
Waterhouse did not discriminate against plaintiff when it 
decided not to repropose her for partner. However, the 
Court found that plaintiff had been constructively dis-
charged because the decision to defer her candidacy in 
1983 "coupled with the ... failure to renominate her, would 
have been viewed by any reasonable senior manager in 
her position as a career-ending action." 825 F.2d at 473. 
The Court remanded the case for the determination of 
"appropriate damages and relief." Id. 
The Supreme Court granted Price Waterhouse's petition 
for certiorari. On May 1, 1989, the Court reversed this 
Court's judgment of liability against Price Waterhouse. 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). The 
Court held that both this Court and the District Court had 
erred in deciding that in a case where both permissible 
1 Judge Williams dissented from the panel's holding affirming liability, 
observing that "the record here provided no causal connection between 
Hopkins' fate and [sexual) stereotyping .... " 825 F.2d at 474. 
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and impermissible factors had contributed to an employ-ment decision, a defendant could escape liability only by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision irrespective of gender. The Court ruled that this showing need only be made by a preponderance of the evidence and remanded the case so that a determination could be made whether Price Water-house's "proof was preponderant." Id. at 1793. 
Upon remand and after additional evidence, briefing and argument, the District Court ruled that Price Waterhouse "ha[ d] not met its burden" under the preponderance of the evidence standard and therefore was liable under Title VII for its 1983 decision deferring plaintiffs partnership candidacy for one year. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand ("Findings"), App. at 228. The court reiterated its original finding that the decision not to re-propose plaintiff for partnership the following year was not discriminatory and expressly articulated that that de-cision was the result of plaintiff's own "unreasonable in-tentional conduct." Id. at 240. Nonetheless, the District Court concluded that it had no choice but to accept as the law of the case the previous conclusion by the Court of Appeals that plaintiff had been constructively discharged when she was not reproposed. Id. at 231. 
In determining the appropriate remedy, the court below ordered Price Waterhouse to admit plaintiff to its part-nership as of July 1, 1990, id. at 233, 236-37, and awarded back pay for the period July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1990 in the amount of $371,175 and reasonable attorney's fees. App. at 252-53. 




B. Statement of the Facts 
Price Waterhouse provides services to corporate and 
government agency clients throughout the United States. 
825 F.2d at 461.LDespite its size, 900 partners in over 90 
offices, Findings, App. at 235, it "has consistently sought 
to maintain the traditional characteristics of a professional 
partnership both in its management and partnership se-
lection practices." 618 F. Supp. at 1111; Findings, App. 
at 221, 234. 
Partnership selection is a conscientious process under-
taken by the partners through the firm's governing Policy 
Board and its Admission Committee. It involves lengthy 
written and oral evaluations, analysis and -discussion based 
upon "well-identified written criteria." Findings, App. at 
221. The court below found that twice as many candidates 
are rejected or def erred each year as are accepted on first 
consideration. Id. at 221-23. 
Among the considerations that form an "important part 
of Price Waterhouse's written partnership evaluation cri-
teria," 618 F. Supp. at 1114, is the candidate's conduct 
toward colleagues and subordinates. The District Court 
found that a deficiency in this regard was "a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to admit a candidate 
to partnership." Id. · Because relationships among personnel 
affects morale, attrition, and the capacity of the firm to 
function with efficiency, the court below agreed that "Price 
Waterhouse had every reason and legal right to come down 
hard on abrasive conduct in men or women seeking part-
nership." Id. at 1120. 
The admissions process in 1982-83 revealed serious de-
ficiencies in plaintiff's interpersonal relationships. Nearly 
two-thirds of the thirty-two partners that submitted writ-
ten comments on plaintiff had objections to her conduct. 
See App. at 37-49. A recurrent theme was at plain · 
was "extremely overbearing," "arrogant and self-cen-
tered," "universally disliked by the staff," and presented 
a "risk that she may abuse authority." Id. at 37, 39, 43. 
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6 
87 candidates in 1983 (618 F. Supp. at 1116) and "more negative comments than any other candidate that year." Findings, App. at 222.2 
The Chairman of the firm's Admissions Committee tes-tified: 
We did . . . talk with the partners throughout the whole admissions process that knew Ann Hopkins best. We spoke with the partners who had dealt with her on a day to day basis, partners who had known her casually and there was a basic underlying pervasive theme in all of our discussions and the responses that came through the partner canvas that she ... had difficulty dealing with staff, relating to both the part-. ners, the peers within the [Office of Government Ser-vices] group and the peers in other offices she visited and she had difficulty in relating and leading and developing staff that worked for her . . . [I]t was not an isolated comment, but it was a pervasive theme that ... ran through a substantial number of partners that had contact with her. 
Findings, App. at 222-23. The firm's Senior Partner and Chairman of the Policy Board testified on remand that "the partners generally believe that Ann had a problem in interpersonal skills and that as a result she was eval-uated evenhandedly." App. at 210. 
The "Admissions Committee wavered between rejecting [plaintiffs] candidacy outright or placing her on hold, but ultimately chose the hold option." Findings, App. at 223. The Policy Board adopted the Admissions Committee's rec-
2 Plaintiff was the only woman candidate in 1982-83. AB of July 1984 Price Waterhouse had seven women partners. 618 F. Supp. at 1112. The District Court rejected plaintiff's claim that "the small number of women partners at Price Waterhouse indicates discrimination," id. at 1116, concluding that "[w]omen have only recently entered the ac-counting and related fields in large numbers and there is evidence that many potential women partners were hired away from Price Water-house by clients and rival accounting firms." Id.; see also 825 F.2d at 464 n.2. 
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7 
ommendation that plaintiff be held " 'at least a year to 
afford time to demonstrate that she has the personal and 
leadership qualities required of a partner.' " 618 F. Supp. 
at 1113. Price Waterhouse regularly held over candidates, 
male and female, "because of concerns about their inter-
personal skills .... " Id. at 1116. 
The "hold" decision provided plaintiff a legitimate and 
fair opportunity to become a Price Waterhouse partner: 
[T]here is little reason to believe the hold was a cyn-
ical gesture; 16 of the 19 candidates placed on hold 
with Ms. Hopkins in 1983 made partner in 1984, and 
in her case the decision to hold her oyer appears to 
have been a considered business decision that her tal-
ent justified giving her candidacy another look. It is 
clear from the record that she was given a genuine 
chance to demonstrate her ability to overcome her 
differences in interpersonal relationships. 
Findings, App. at 241-42. 
The District Court found that plaintiff's "conduct pro-
vided ample justification" for the complaints that resulted 
in the deferral of plaintiff's candidacy. 618 F. Supp. at 
1114. However, the court also concluded that some of the 
comments about her may have been "tainted by unarti-
culated, unconscious assumptions related to sex." Id. at 
1118. Plaintiff's expert witness testified that women en-
gaged in assertive behavior may be judged more critically 
than males. While this witness "could not pinpoint the 
degree to which stereotyping had influenced the selection 
process" and was unable to state whether any "particular 
reaction was determined by the operation of sex stereo-
types," id. at 1117, the court found that "stereotyping 
played an undefined role in blocking plaintiff's admission 
to partnership in this instance." Id. at 1118. 
After being informed of the decision in March 1983 that 
her partnership candidacy would be held over, plaintiff 
undermined her chances for a Price Waterhouse partner-
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sition did so because he found plaintiff "disagreeable to work with and had reservations about her technical skills and dedication to the firm." Id. at 1114. The District Court found "no proof that his position was animated by ani-mosity toward her sex." Id. 
An important ally of plaintiff's and a key partner in plaintiff's office and department switched to opposition be-cause of the following incident: 
Soon after the hold decision, in April 1983, Ms. Hop-kins arranged a luncheon date with an OGS [Office of Government Services] partner, Donald Epelbaum. The evidence is strong that, at that luncheon, Ms. · Hopkins misstated the substance of a meeting, held a few days earlier, between herself and Joseph E . Connor, the Chairman and Senior Partner of Price Waterhouse, regarding her partnership prospects. Ms. Hopkins misleadingly implied that Mr. Connor had disparaged certain partners who opposed her candi-dacy and that he had warned of the adverse conse-quences his partners might experience for opposing her the next year. Mr. Epelbaum felt immediately that Ms. Hopkins had misrepresented Mr. Connor's posi-tion, because he knew it was not Mr. Connor's style to attempt to manipulate partnership decisions and to disparage his partners to a non-partner employee .... Ms. Hopkins' misrepresentation of Mr. Connor's views was a key factor influencing Mr. Epelbaum to with-draw his previously strong support of Ms. Hopkins. 
Findings, App. at 240-41. The District Court found Mr. Epelbaum "to be a credible witness and accept[ed] his account of these events." 618 F. Supp. at 1114. 




ings, App. at 240-41. Plaintiff's "own intentional conduct 
materially prevented a fair test of her performance during 
the hold period and ... she herself created a condition 
which removed any possibility that she would be accepted 
as partner after the hold." Id. at 242. 
After she left Price Waterhouse in January 1984, 
plaintiff "failed to make a reasonable effort to obtain sim-
ilar employment . . . when opportunities elsewhere clearly 
existed." Id. at 243. Although there was "a significant 
demand both locally and nationwide for management con-
sultants at Big Eight and other accounting firms, man-
agement consulting firms, and within large businesses," 
id., plaintiff "failed to make a reasonable~ conscientious 
effort to work at her calling at a level available to her 
which would satisfy her duty to mitigate damages." Id. at 
243-44. 
Consistent with her conduct at Price Waterhouse, 
plaintiff continued to be her own worst enemy: 
It appears from the evidence that she over-emphasized 
her status in her own mind and chose work accord-
ingly-first taking the risks of a new business venture 
and then turning to the relatively noncompetitive at-
mosphere of government service. She was simply not 
interested in the private sector except as a principal 
[partner] and found no immediate or guaranteed part-
nership available among those who had more remu-
nerative work to offer _jn --her field. So long as 
partnership eventually remained somewhat conjec-
tural, she was not interested. Vindication dominated 
her thinking and kept her earnings below what she 
could have earned by reasonable effort in her field. 
Findings, App. at 244. 
Plaintiff made virtually no effort to seek a position lead-
ing to a partnership at another major accounting firm and 
her conduct continued to undermine her career prospects. 
For example, she abruptly walked out of a meeting with 
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a partner of a "Big Eight" firm who was willing to discuss a senior manager level position on a " 'relatively fast track' " toward partnership because the proposal did not offer an instant partnership. Id. at 245. 
Plaintiff "never formally applied for a management con-sulting job at any firm," did "not send her resume" to prospective employers, made "almost no effort to work with executive search firms," "rejected at least two offers of employment with smaller firms," and "made no genuine try" to find a comparable position. Id. at 245-46. 
Instead of seeking out positions that were or would lead to employment comparable financially and otherwise to a Price Waterhouse partnership, plaintiff went into business for herself and, a few years later, for personal reasons, she· abandoned her business and went to work for the World Bank, where she now earns approximately $92,000 per annum. She could have found work that paid sub-stantially more but, "[f]or whatever reason, she simply chose not to seek such a position." Id. at 247. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court below made four significant errors that re-quire reversal. 
1. It was clearly erroneous to conclude that Price Water-house had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Hopkins partnership candidacy would have been deferred regardless of plaintiff's sex. The evidence was direct, widespread, consistent, and largely uncontradicted that plaintiff was abusive to subordinates and generally unpleasant to her peers. Those comments reflected a gen-uine and material deficiency in an area that was a legit-imate criterion in the written Price Waterhouse partnership selection standards. And the partners took the logical, rea-sonable and customary step for a candidate in these cir-cumstances: They held her over for ~other year to give her an opportunity to overcome her difficulties. However, her temperament continued to frustrate her chances for advancement, destroying her opportunity to be reproposed for partner. 
L 
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Neither the plaintiff nor the trial court even attempted 
to weigh the mountain of gender-neutral criticisms of 
plaintiff's interpersonal relationships against the few com-
ments that may arguably have been the product of sexual 
stereotyping. In fact, the analytical approach urged upon 
and accepted by the court below did not involve weighing 
the evidence at all. Instead, the court held that because 
some of the comments about plaintiff may have reflected 
stereotyping, all of them were presumptively invalid in the 
absence of further explanation by the partners submitting 
those comments or by expert testimony to the effect that 
facially gender-neutral comments were indeed gender-neu-
tral. By this convenient but entirely irrational process, all 
the criticisms of plaintiff's "conduct" that the District 
Court had once found to have provided '"ample justifica-
tion" for the deferral of her partnership candidacy were 
simply erased from the equation. 
This approach elevated speculation above actual evi-
dence. On the one side, there was serious and substantial 
criticism of plaintiff's manner, incontrovertible evidence 
that male candidates with similar problems were perceived 
and treated similarly, and a continuing pattern of impul-
sive, aggressive, thoughtless behavior. The vast majority 
of the criticisms of plaintiff did not mention her sex and 
made no reference to any subject that could even arguably 
be said to reflect sexual stereotyping. On the other side, 
plaintiff presented literally nothing except the generalized 
testimony of her expert that virtually any comment that 
characterized plaintiff as abrasive, abusive or excessively 
aggressive was suspect. But even plaintiff's expert could 
not label most of the criticisms of plaintiff as demonstrably 
tainted by stereotyping. 
Plaintiff's expert may have been enough to establish that 
some unquantified measure of impermissible considerations 
had been allowed to seep into the partnership selection 
process and shift the burden of proof to Price Waterhouse. 
But surely the trial court had the legal duty not to dis-
regard the painstaking decisionmaking process that Price 
.. .., __ .. : :,_,;;i:.?,;;.~-... -.;: .... -_,~-:-J_~~ . 
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Waterhouse did apply and the host of unchallenged indi-vidual critical comments and evidence of equal treatment of other candidates that it did produce. Had the court below not simply neutralized all the concerns about plaintiff's personality, it would have had no choice but to conclude that plaintiff's candidacy, regardless of her gen-der, would have been deferred. 
2. An egregious miscarriage of justice will result if this Court does not correct the Dtstrict Court's erroneous con-clusion that it had virtually no choice but to award plaintiff a partnership and back pay because of this Court's pre-vious statement "that Ms. Hopkins was constructively dis-charged when [ the decision was made] not to repropose her [for partner.]" Findings, App. at 231. The District Court had squarely held after the first trial that the de-cision not to repropose plaintiff for partnership was not connected with her sex, and was not discriminatory. Plaintiff did not even appeal that finding. On remand, the District Court reiterated in clear and unmistakable terms that after the deferral, plaintiff was given a "genuine chance" to overcome her difficulties and to become a Price Waterhouse partner. Plaintiff alone destroyed that oppor-tunity, "materially prevented a fair test of her perform-ance," and "removed any possibility" that she would be made partner. 
The decision by the Court of Appeals that the hold de-cision, "coupled with" the failure to repropose plaintiff for partner, constituted a constructive discharge was therefore based on an incomplete or erroneous reading of the trial court's analysis of the decision not to repropose. Further-more, the holdover process was an accepted and acceptable Price Waterhouse means of correcting perceived deficien-cies, not a death knell to a candidate's partnership hopes as the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded. 
· .. .....,...._..-----
The law of the case doctrine did not compel the District Court to accept the Court of Appeals' constructive dis-charge decision because it was part of an opinion that was vacated and not binding on the District Court. Moreover, 
... . ·_, . 
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for her when she, herself, was the principal impediment to the attainment of that goal. 
Finally, if this Court determines that Price Waterhouse is liable to plaintiff under Title VII, but agrees that plaintiff is not entitled to a Price Waterhouse partnership, plaintiff's recovery should be limited to attorney's fees and back pay for a limited period. In light of her failure to mitigate damages and even to seek a comparable position after leaving Price Waterhouse, she is entitled to no more. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
PRICE WATERHOUSE ESTABLISHED THAT IT WOULD HAVE DEFERRED PLAINTIFF'S PARTNERSHIP CANDIDACY REGARDLESS OF HER GENDER 
The District Court erroneously concluded that Price Waterhouse had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff's partnership candidacy would have been deferred regardless of her gender. The evidence was substantial and manifestly preponderant that any candidate who had presented the record amassed by plaintiff would have been deferred wholly independent of any other con-sideration. The Court below failed to weigh the evidence; had it done so, Price Waterhouse would have prevailed, and properly should prevail, on liability. 
Price Waterhouse acknowledges that to the extent the District Court properly reviewed and weighed the evi-dence, any challenge to the decision below will be rejected unless that decision was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., An-derson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). Although it is a difficult standard, this Court has not hesitated to overturn district court decisions when the clearly erro-neous standard has been met. See, e.g., Palmer v. Baker, 52 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1458, 1461-62 (D.C . Cir. 1990). 
The clearly erroneous standard is considerably less for-midable, however, when a trial court has not actually re-
15 
viewed and evaluated the evidence, see Underwood v. 
District of Columbia Armory Bd., 816 F.2d 769, 775-76 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing factual finding where district 
court appeared not to have weighed substantial evidence 
at all), or has committed a legal error in the process of 
doing so. Case v. Morrisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1307-08 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973) (questions of law "do not find shelter in the 
'clearly erroneous' requirement" and a "finding is 'clearly 
erroneous' .. . if it was induced by an erroneous application 
of the law"). In this case the District Court simply nullified 
all of the evidence on one side of the evidentiary equation. 
Thus, the District Court's judgment of liability against 
Price Waterhouse must be reversed because its process 
was erroneous as a matter of law. Alternatively, because 
the District Court failed to give sufficient weight to Price 
Waterhouse's evidence as a result of a thin and inadequate 
generic challenge to that evidence by plaintiff, its judgment 
of liability was manifestly and clearly erroneous. 
The evidence was substantial and consistent that 
plaintiff's interpersonal skills generated complaints 
throughout her career at Price Waterhouse that were 
wholly unrelated to her gender. The Price Waterhouse 
partnership selection process, described supra at 5, was 
thorough and punctilious. It produced a widespread out-
pouring of negative comments and "no" votes. As the 
District Court held, "the firm's practice of giving 'no' 
votes great weight treated male and female candidates in 
the same way." 618 F. Supp. at 1116. 
The vast majority of the negative comments regarding 
plaintiff's "considerable problems dealing with staff and 
peers," id. at 1120, had nothing to with gender and were 
never identified by plaintiff, her expert witness, the Dis-
trict Court, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court 
as containing any language that revealed sexual stereo-
typing. For example, one partner commented that plaintiff 
is "just plain rough on people. Our staff did not enjoy 
working for her. There is a risk that she may abuse au-
thority." App. at 43. Another partner noted that plaintiff 
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"can be abrasive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with [and], as a result, causes significant turmoil." Id. at 42.3 
The record is replete with numerous similar gender-neu-tral expressions of concern over plaintiff's difficult rela-tions with subordinates, peers, and with partners.• These comments were elicited independently from different part-ners in different offices based upon a variety of experi-ences with plaintiff at different points in her career at the firm. They were never shown to have been influenced by each other or related in any way other than their uniform and intense focus upon plaintiff's mistreatment of col-leagues and subordinates. 
Plaintiff's peers and subordinates, who were not even alleged to have been affected by any sexual stereotyping in the partnership selection process, were equally forceful about the difficulties involved in working with and for 
3 These two partners were called as witnesses by Price Waterhouse during the 1985 trial and they testified as to the factual bases and nondiscriminatory motivations for their comments. App. at 126-34; id. at 147-69. The District Court's blanket statement on remand that none of "those partners making negative comments [have] been pre-sented for appraisal of the motivations underlying their comments," Findings, App. at 227, simply overlooked this testimony and is in-correct. 
• See App. at 43 ("Staff does not like working for her."); id. at 44 ("On occasion, she'll forget herself [and] lose sensitivity for staff."); id. at 41 ("very abrasive in her dealings with staff."); id. at 40 ("caused a complete alienation of the staff ... [and] a fear that they would have to work with Ann if we won the project."); id. at 39 ("is universally disliked by the staff and ... does not possess the interpersonal skills or personal attributes that are critical"); id. at 37 ("tended to alienate the staff in that she was extremely overbearing"); id. ("can also be abrasive in dealing with staff members"); id. (projected "arrogance [and] self-centered attitude"); id. at 41 ("rather unpleasant"); id. at 39 ("interpersonal relationships are extremely poor"); id. at 43 ("still has a few rough spots which need to be corrected"); id. ("needs a chance to demonstrate people skills"); id. at 38 ("I believe Ann does not possess the leadership qualities we desire in our ptrs."). 
17 
plaintiff, 5 and even female staff members who testified on 
plaintiff's behalf pointed out that "her hard driving style 
might be regarded as 'controversial' and that it required 
'diplomacy, patience, and guts' to work with her." 618 F. 
Supp. at 1114 & n. 5 (quoting Tr. 423, 434). 
Plaintiff herself testified that she was "abrasive" and 
"hard driving" (App. at 60-62) in dealing with staff. Price 
Waterhouse also introduced "contemporaneous records of 
counseling sessions conducted well before the plaintiff was 
proposed for partnership [that] indicate that the partners 
found her too assertive, overly critical of others, [and] 
impatient with her staff .... " 618 F. Supp. at 1114 & 
n.4; App. at 16-36. "At the time, plaintiff indicated that 
she agreed with many of these criticisms." Id. 
Price Waterhouse partnership "candidates are regularly 
held because of concerns about their interpersonal 
skills .... " 618 F. Supp. at 1116. Male candidates who 
were as highly regarded as plaintiff in the area of technical 
skills, business generation, and dedication to the firm were 
either placed on hold or rejected outright because of in-
terpersonal skills problems equivalent to or even less pro-
nounced than plaintiff's. See, e.g., Def. Ex. 64; App. at 
121-22.6 Thus, for example, a male candidate who was held 
• For example, one consultant employed by Price Waterhouse de-
scribed plaintiff's manner as "abrupt" and insensitive" (App. at 136) 
and testified that "it was tough dealing with Ann and I don't think 
I've had that type of same tough experience prior to or after" working 
with plaintiff. Id. at 144. There also was evidence that plaintiff man-
ifested a "condescending attitude[ ]" toward staff assigned to her proj-
ects. Id. at 133. Working for her was "demeaning at times" (id. at 
136) and one consultant testified that he felt Hopkins "looked down 
upon" him. Id. at 137. One individual actually quit the firm in part 
because he could not tolerate working with plaintiff (id. at 76-77), citing 
an incident in which plaintiff had screamed obscenities at him for 45 
minutes. Id. at 76. 
• Price Waterhouse appended to its Brief on Remand a summary of 
the files contained in Def. Ex. 64 of several male candidates whose 
profiles were similar to plaintiff's. See App. at 172-91. This is seemingly 
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in high esteem by virtually every Price Waterhouse part-ner with whom he had worked was "held" because he had a "history of being tough and dogmatic to the point of causing problems with staff and clients." App. at 172. 
Historical evidence established that Price Waterhouse treated male and female candidates with deficient inter-personal skills equally. Plaintiff was unable to undermine or refute this evidence. After reviewing the records of the 135 candidates (App. at 58-59) elected to the partnership during the three-year period 1982-84, 7 plaintiff could point to only two candidates admitted in the face of material criticism of their interpersonal skills. 618 F. Supp. at 1115 & n.6. The District Court found that "Price Waterhouse had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for distinguish-ing between plaintiff'' and those two partners. Id. at 1115. 
The decision of Price Waterhouse at issue in this case was only a one-year deferral of the Hopkins partnership candidacy. Twenty-one of the candidates in plaintiff's part-nership class were rejected outright. 825 F.2d at 462. The Admissions Committee "wavered," Findings, App. at 223, but ultimately chose the hold alternative. The District Court found that the deferral was intended in good faith to pro-vide her with a '' genuine chance to demonstrate her ability to overcome her differences in interpersonal relationships." Id. at 242. Most candidates held over each year make partner the following year. See id. at 241-42. Making plaintiff a partner or rejecting her outright would have 
contemplated should be considered in determining whether the firm had met its burden on the "same decision" issue. See 109 S. Ct. at 1791; compare NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 396-97, 404 (1983) (when the "transgressions that purportedly would have ... prompted [the] discharge were commonplace, and no trans-gressor had ever before received any kind of discipline," employer failed to meet burden of showing discharge would have occurred absent an-tiunion animus). 
7 "Price Waterhouse made every document generated by [its] admis-sion process on candidates proposed for admission in 1982, 1983 and 1984 available to the plaintiff during the course of discovery in this case." 618 F. Supp. at 1112. 
19 
; • 
been substantially irrevocable. A deferral, however, was not 
permanent and it is not difficult to understand how even 
materially lesser doubts about plaintiff's capacity to control 
her own behavior would have justified a "hold" decision. 
Finally, there was direct testimony in 1985 from the 
Chairman of the firm's Admissions Committee and the 
Chairman and Senior Partner of the firm. They both tes-
tified unequivocally that it was plaintiff's actual conduct 
in dealing with staff and peers, not sex stereotyping or 
"discrimination in any way,"8 that led to the decision to 
place plaintiff's candidacy on hold. As Justice White ex-
plained in his concurring opinion in this case: 
In a mixed motive case, where the legitimate motive 
found would have been ample grounds for the action 
taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the 
action would have been taken for the legitimate rea-
sons alone, this should be ample proof. This would 
even more plainly be the case where the employer 
denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but 
the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, 
factors motivated the adverse action. 
109 S. Ct. at 1796 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Other than recalling the same witnesses that testified 
at the first trial to repeat their testimony and recite once 
again that their criticisms of plaintiff's conduct was not 
motivated by sexual stereotyping, Price Waterhouse could 
have done little more to satisfy its burden of proof. 
The Supreme Court's mandate directed the District 
Court to reweigh the evidence under the preponderance 
of the evidence standard-"the rock bottom at the fact-
finding level of civil litigation." Charlton v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 543 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Prepon-
derance of the evidence simply requires that a party prove 
8 See, e.g., App., 72-73; id. at 91-112; id. at 210. A partner who was 
a member of both the Admissions Committee and the Policy Board also 
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that a fact is more likely true than not. See 3 L. Sand, J. Siffert, S. Reiss, J. Sexton & J . Thorpe, Modern Federal Jury Instructions 1 73.01 (1990). 
The District Court had already found that the factors described above, including plaintiff's "conduct," provided "ample justification for the ... decision" to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy. 618 F. Supp. at 1114.9 Plaintiff, on the other hand, was able to point to only a few of the comments10 as even arguably gender-related. Her expert felt that any criticism of plaintiff was illegitimate, but could not isolate any particular reaction as affected by stereotyping. Id. at 1117. The District Court itself found it !'impossible" to identify any particular negative reaction as being motivated by plaintiff's sex. Id. at 1118. 
Plaintiff did not want the evidence weighed on remand and developed the argument that it was "impossible" to weigh the evidence because the existence of sex stereo-typing in the process acted to disqualify all the comments. See, e.g., Pl. Br. on Remand at 2-11. Any negative reaction to plaintiff had to reflect stereotypical responses to an aggressive woman. 
The District Court apparently accepted this theory. Rather than reweighing the evidence under a "less ex-acting standard" of proof (Findings, App. at 219), the District Court reopened the issue whether any of the firm's concerns regarding plaintiff's interpersonal skills were in fact legitimate and nondiscriminatory. See, e.g., id. at 226-27 & n.6. It concluded that it could not engage in an evaluation of the evidence because Price Waterhouse had "failed to separate out those comments tainted by sexism 
9 The District Court simply walked away from this finding by ob-serving that it was included in the portion of the court's opinion having to do with whether the objections to plaintiff were fabricated and not in the portion of the opinion having to do with sex stereotyping. Find-ings, App. at 227 n.6. However, the genuine complaints about plaintiff's conduct were no less compelling because of the District Court's decision about where to discuss them in its opinion. 
10 See 825 F.2d at 463. 
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from those free of sexism," id. at 227, and because Price 
Waterhouse had not "identif[ied] each sexually stereotyped 
negative comment." Id. at 226. Thus, on remand the Dis-
trict Court did not analyze, evaluate, or weigh the evidence 
at all.11 
11 The District Court faulted Price Waterhouse for not producing ad-
ditional evidence "in light of the lowered burden of proof," Findings, 
App. at 220, particularly "to enable it to differentiate between all 
sexually stereotyped comments and comments not influenced by ster-
eotyping." Id. at 226. However, the plaintiff contended that the issue 
on remand was the same as in the first case, only the standard of 
proof had been changed, and "emphatically" opposed reopening the 
record on liability. Tr. of Oct. 3, 1989 Hearing at 1-3. The Supreme 
Court stated that a remand would permit the tri~l court to "determine 
whether Price Waterhouse had poved" that it would have put the 
plaintiff's candidacy on hold regardless of her gender. 109 S. Ct. at 
1793 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); id. at 1806 (O'Connor, J ., 
concurring in the judgment) ("On remand, the District Court should 
determine whether Price Waterhouse has shown by a preponderance 
of the evidence that if gender had not not been a part of the process" 
it would have made the same decision). Thus, it is by no means clear 
that it would not have been an abuse of discretion to reopen the 
evidence on this issue on remand. 
The Supreme Court also implied that subjective evidence in the form 
of the employer's own testimony would be suspect. Id. at 1791 & n.14 
(plurality opinion). And the Justices expressed considerable skepticism 
regarding the need for or value of expert testimony to tell a court 
whether comments reflect sex stereotyping. Id. at 1793 ("[i]t takes no 
special training" to recognize sex stereotyping); see id. at 1805 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in the judgment) ("in my view testimony such as 
Dr. Fiske's in this case, standing alone, would not justify shifting the 
burden"); id. at 1813 n.5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinions 
cannot be read as requiring factfinders to credit testimony based on 
this type of analysis."). As demonstrated in the text above, the evidence 
in the record consisted of strong criticisms of plaintiff's conduct by 
partners, colleagues, and subordinates, objective evidence of equal treat-
ment of male candidates with similar problems and characteristics, a 
continuing pattern of conduct by plaintiff that persisted even after the 
deferral of her candidacy and after she left Price Waterhouse, and 
direct testimony of partners in the firm that their concerns were ad-
dressed to plaintiff's conduct and not her sex. The record established 
that plaintiff suffered from deficiencies in her interpersonal skills that 
warranted, and would have led to, the hold decision irrespective of her 
gender. 
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The District Court's approach was manifestly erroneous and unfair, and cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's mandate in this case. Price Waterhouse did not have the burden on remand of proving that its concern with plaintiff's interpersonal skills was nondiscriminatory-the firm had already established "that Hopkins' interper-sonal problems were a legitimate concern," 109 S. Ct. at 1792, and the sole issue on remand was whether this le-gitimate concern "standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision." Id. There was a preponder-ance of gender-neutral negative comments as well as mul-tiple additional factors, including direct testimony from key firm decisionmakers, that demonstrated that Price Water-house's "probable decision in the absence of an impermis-sible motive," id. at 1791, would have been to place the Hopkins candidacy on hold. The District Court, however, allowed the speculation of plaintiff's expert to trump hard evidence and to disqualify as tainted every criticism of plaintiff's "conduct" that in the first trial it had found to have been legitimate, understandable and ample. Because some expressions of objections to plaintiff's conduct may have been improper, the District Court threw the baby out with the bath water. 
The District Court's rationale creates a peculiar Catch 22 for a defendant accused of gender bias. Every criticism of abusive conduct by a woman becomes ipso facto an example of judging a woman more critically "because ag-gressive conduct is viewed as a masculine characteristic." 618 F. Supp. at 1118. Thus, no such comment can be proven to be legitimate because every such comment can be characterized as "unarticulated, unconscious assump-tions related to sex." Id. In this world, a woman who is disagreeable and abusive to subordinates cannot be held accountable for such behavior. 
23 
II 
THE DECISION NOT TO REPROPOSE PLAINTIFF 
FOR PARTNER DID NOT RESULT IN A 
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
In considering an appropriate remedy, the District Court 
found itself facing a , perplexing conundrum. The District 
Court knew, and had twice expressly found, that while 
sexual stereotyping may arguably have been a factor in 
Price Waterhouse's initial decision to defer consideration 
of plaintiff's partnership candidacy, discrimination had not 
been responsible for plaintiff's ultimate failure to make 
partner. That goal was put out of her reach by the delib-
erate and unreasonable conduct of the plaintiff herself. But 
the Court of Appeals had inexplicably "coupled" (825 F.2d 
at 4 73) the hold decision with the failure to repropose, 
even though the former was found to have been tainted 
by discrimination and the latter was not, and had held 
that the two events taken together constituted a construc-
tive discharge. Id. If this was the law of the case, and 
beyond the District Court's ability to modify, then the 
District Court felt that it had no alternative but to award 
plaintiff a partnership even though the plaintiff herself had 
created the condition that "removed any possibility" that 
she could be partner. 
In order to unscramble and analyze properly the events 
leading up to the District Court's dilemma, it is necessary 
first to review briefly what happened to plaintiff at Price 
Waterhouse. As the District Court perceived it, a flaw in 
the process that reviewed plaintiff's partnership candidacy 
in the 1982-83 fiscal year contributed to the decision to 
defer her candidacy for reconsideration the next fiscal year. 
But holding a candidate for further consideration to the 
next year was quite routine and most def erred candidates 
made it successfttlly the next year: 
A holdover was shown to be part of the process by 
which the firm attempted to correct or minimize a 
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24 
put on hold along with Ms. Hopkins in 1983 made 
partner the next year. 
Findings, App. at 231 n.8. Thus, even if the hold decision 
had been discriminatory, plaintiff was given a genuine, 
good faith, nondiscriminatory opportunity to be a Price 
Waterhouse partner. However, plaintiff was not repro-
posed for partner during the 1983-1984 cycle because she 
alienated her supporters and took herself out of the run-
ning. Once she was not reproposed, her chances for a Price 
Waterhouse partnership became slight, and, although she 
was invited to stay on as a senior manager, she resigned 
in January of 1984. 
The District Court did not see these events as a con-
structive discharge because it did not feel that defendant 
had driven plaintiff to quit by making her working con-
ditions intolerable. However, the Court of Appeals saw it 
differently. Redefining the law of constructive discharge, 
the court focused on the fact that plaintiff's ambition was 
to be a Price Waterhouse partner and that after she was 
not reproposed, it had become " 'very unlikely' " that she 
would ever become one. 825 F .2d at 4 72. The Court of 
Appeals assumed that it was "the customary and nearly 
unanimous practice" at Price Waterhouse and at other 
firms for senior managers who have been passed over for 
partnership to resign. Thus, according to the Court of 
Appeals, because plaintiff had been pushed into a dead-
end, her departure was not voluntary and its circumstances 
constituted a constructive discharge. 
The problem with the Court of Appeals decision is the 
presumption, contrary to the direct and unappealed finding 
below, that the decision not to repropose was part of the 
discriminatory process. If it had been, plaintiff may indeed 
have been stalled in reaching her career objective as a 
result of discrimination and a constructive discharge find-
ing might have been understandable. However, only the 
deferral decision was, even arguably, discriminatory. At 
that point, plaintiff had a viable chance to make partner 
and, as the District Court found, it most certainly was not 
25 
the custom of senior managers to leave after having been 
"held." In fact, most of them stayed and made partner 
the following year. Therefore, at the point of the deferral 
decision, there was no colorable argument that plaintiff 
had been constructively discharged. She was a viable can-
didate with a legitimate chance to succeed. 
At this point, plaintiff pulled the plug on her own career. 
She, not Price Waterhouse, caused herself not to be re-
proposed. Under these circumstances, a conclusion that 
there had been a constructive discharge is plainly contrary 
to the facts and law. 
The plaintiff argued below, and the District Court 
agreed, that since Price Waterhouse did not "appeal" the 
Court of Appeals' constructive discharge decision, it is the 
law of the case and, whether wrong or not, was binding 
on the court. But that is not correct. 
After the Supreme Court reversed the judgment against 
Price Waterhouse on liability, this Court issued an order 
vacating both its August 4, 1987 "mandate" and the judg-
ment of the District Court and remanded the case to the 
District Court for "further proceedings." App. at 171. In 
this Circuit, the "mandate" of the Court of Appeals "con-
sist[s] of .. . the Court's opinion and judgment." City of 
Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344, 
347 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977).12 Thus, when this Court vacated 
its mandate, it automatically and necessarily vacated its 
August 4, 1987 opinion in this case, and necessarily 
stripped the opinion of any precedential effect at later 
stages of the proceedings. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975). 13 
12 "This Circuit does not utilize a formal document called a mandate. 
Rather the Clerk issues a certified copy of the judgment and the opinion 
. .. of the Court in lieu of mandate. The rules and the Court's orders 
refer to that document as 'the mandate.' " Handbook of Practice and 
Internal Procedures, XII (2) (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1987) (emphasis added). 
See App. at 170. 
1• Prior to the 1990 trial on remand, and even during that trial, 
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Moreover, even if, as the District Court found, this Court 
did not intend to vacate its earlier opinion, "the doctrine 
of the law of the case 'is not an inexorable command that 
rigidly binds a court to its former decisions but rather is 
an expression of good sense and wise judicial practice.' " 
Melong v. Micronesian Claims Commisswn, 643 F.2d 10, 
17 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation omitted); see Sa.fir v. Dol,e, 
718 F.2d 475, 481 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Application of 
the doctrine is in any event discretionary"), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1206 (1984). This Court has recognized that where 
"adherence to the law of the case will work a grave in-
justice," Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d 578, 
585 (D.C. Cir. 1980), or " 'the [previous] decision was 
clearly erroneous," Melong, 643 F.2d at 17 (citation omit-
ted), a departure from the law of the case is justified and 
appropriate. See also Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 
618 n.8 (1983). 
This is such a case. The District Court's second opinion 
has made clear that it was plaintiffs own ''unreasonable 
intentional conduct" that " 'locked [her] into a position 
from which she could apparently obtain no relief,' " 825 
F.2d at 472 (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)), not any discriminatory conduct on the 
part of Price Waterhouse. Therefore, it is not legally or 
factually correct that plaintiff was constructively dis-
charged when the partners of Price Waterhouse decided 
not to repropose plaintiff for partner. Since the District 
Court's partnership order is substantially predicated upon 
its assumption that this Court's constructive discharge rul-
ing left it no choice but to order partnership in this case, 
that assumption should be set aside and the issue of the 
appropriate remedy should be reconsidered. 
recognize that [the Court of Appeals'] opinion was vacated following 
the Supreme Court's decision . .. . " Pl. Pretrial Br. On Remedy, at 5 
(Jan. 17, 1990). See also 1990 Tr. at 86 ("we think that [the Court of 
Appeals' decision] had be[en] vacated."). 
27 
III 
TITLE VII DOES NOT EMPOWER COURTS TO COMPEL 
PARTNERSHIP AS A REMEDY 
The question whether federal courts have authority un-
der Title VII to compel individuals to form a partnership 
is an issue of first • impression. Indeed, no federal court 
has ever created a partnership to remedy a Title VII vi-
olation. However, the court below inexplicably determined 
that its authority to create a partnership was "firmly es-
tablished" by the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984). B~t the plaintiff in 
Hishon did not seek a partnership. Therefore, the issue 
was not before the Court. Id. at 72. The "narrow holding" 
(id. at 78 n.10) in Hishon that "in appropriate circum-
stances partnership consideration may qualify as a term, 
condition, or privilege of a person's employment" for pur-
poses of Title VII does not establish the power of courts 
under Title VII to create professional partnership rela-
tionships. 
Title VII expressly applies only to "employment" ar-
rangements and makes "reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees" an available remedy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) 
( emphasis added). There is nothing in Title VII to suggest 
that it was intended to authorize courts to transform sim-
ple employment relationships into partnerships, or to order 
individuals to become partners once their employment re-
lationship has been terminated. 
A. Title VII Does Not Authorize Partnership As A 
Remedy 
"As in all cases involving statutory interpretation," the 
Court must "look first to the language of the statute it-
self." Hughey v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1979, 1982 
(1990); e.g., Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, 
Inc., No. 89-624 (U.S. June 21, 1990); Moore v. District 
of Columbia, No. 88-7003, slip op. at 5-7 (D.C. Cir. May 
9, 1990) (en bane). The plain language of Title VII makes 
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to create partnerships to remedy employment discrimina-tion. 
Title VII prohibits "unlawful employment practices for an employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Section 2000e(b) de-fines an "employer" as a "person . . . who has fifteen or more employees" and § 2000e(a) defines the term person to include "partnerships." Section 2000e(t) defines an em-ployee as "an individual employed by an employer." The statute's remedial section provides, in pertinent part: 
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice .. . the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). Title VII speaks only of orders that require the "hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee . . .. " Id. (em-phasis added) A partnership may be an employer because Title VII expressly says so, but a partner is not an em-ployee because a partner is not "an individual employed by an employer." 
As Justice Powell observed in a concurring opinion in Hishon "[t]he relationship among . . . partners differs markedly from that between employer and employee." 467 U.S. at 79-80 (footnote omitted). A partnership is a vol-untary and intentional "association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." Unif. Part-nership Act § 6 and official comment, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969). 14 
u " 'A partnership is generally said to be created when persons join together their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying on a trade, profession, or business and when there is community of interest in the profits and losses.' " Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946)). 
. ' 
29 
The "essence of the partnership is the common conduct 
of a shared enterprise." Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79-80 (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
On the other hand, an "'employee,' according to all 
standard dictionaries, according to the law as the courts 
have stated it, and according to the understanding of al-
most everyone, ... means someone who works for another 
for hire. . . . 'Employees' work for wages and salaries un-
der direct supervision.' " Allied Chemical & Alkali Work-
ers Local Unum 1 v. Pittslrurgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 
157, 167 (1971) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess. 18 (194 7)) ( emphasis deleted). 15 
This Court is " 'bound to assume that the legislative 
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words 
used.' " St. Agnes Hospital v. Sullivan, No. 89-5144, slip 
op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1990) (quoting INS v. Cordoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)). Congress authorized 
the courts to reinstate, hire, or promote employees, as 
employees, into employment positions.16 It did not em-
power the judicial creation of partnerships. 
15 In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Court concluded that Congress did 
not intend "the term 'employee' ... to be stretched beyond its plain 
meaning embracing only those who work for hire," and held that re-
tirees are not "employees" for purposes of the National Labor Relations 
Act ("NLRA"). The Court in Hishon relied upon Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 
noting that the "meaning of [the NLRA's] analogous language sheds 
light on the Title VII provision at issue here." 467 U.S. at 76 & n.7. 
Because "nothing in the legislative history of [Title VII] explicitly ad-
dresses the definition of employee," Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 
F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987), the Court's 
approach in Pittsburgh Plate Glass is especially instructive in this case. 
1• Section 2000e-5(g) also states that a court may order "any other 
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." However, "[i]n light 
of the principle of ejusdem generis-that a general statutory term should 
be understood in light of the specific terms that surround it-the catch-
all phrase should not be read to introduce" partnership into the Title 
VII remedial scheme. Hughey, 110 S. Ct. at 1984; see, e.g., Federal 
Maritime Commission v. Seatrain Lines Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973) 
(holding that "catch-all provision" is "to be read as bringing within a 
statute categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated"), 
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A contrary reading of the statute would be illogical. 
Justice Powell in Hislwn pointedly emphasized that "the 
Court's opinion should not be read as extending Title VII 
to the management of a . . . firm by its partners. The 
reasoning of the Court's opinion does not require that the 
relationship among partners be characterized as an 'em-
ployment relationship to which Title VII would apply." 467 
U.S. at 79. Thus, "[t]o date, courts have shown no dis-
position to extend [Title VII] to general partners." Wheeler 
v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987). For example, in Wheeler, the 
court noted that the "requirement that [Title VII] cover 
only employment situations suggests that Congress per-
ceived a need to limit the application of [the] statute," id. 
at 276, and concluded that Title VII does not apply to the 
relationship among partners.17 It is submitted that, if Title 
VII does not apply to the relationship among partners, it 
cannot reasonably be interpreted to authorize the courts 
to order individuals to create and enter into a partnership 
relationship and to supervise that relationship thereafter. 
The history and purposes of Title VII do not suggest 
otherwise. Although the legislative history of the statute 
speaks in broad terms about the "wide discretion" to fash-
ion equitable remedies vested in the district courts, the 
drafters of the statute did not mention partnership or 
other specific relief unrelated to employment as a remedial 
alternative.18 
affg, 460 F .2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The specific, express statutory 
language necessarily restricts the jurisdiction of the courts to equitable 
relief relating to employment relationships. 
11 See also Burke v. Friedman, 556 F .2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting 
argument that "partners can be regarded as employees rather than as 
employers who own and manage the operation of the business" under 
Title VII.); EEOC No. Dec. 85-4 (Mar. 18, 1985) (partners who are 
"not employed by the partnership," but "rather . . . are the co-owners 
who control and manage the business" cannot "be considered em• 
ployee[s] under Title VII"). Plaintiff has conceded that Title VII does 
not apply to the relationship among partners. Appellee's Opp. to Mot. 
for Stay at 5 n.3. 
18 See, e.g., Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 1746, The Equal Em-
I II 
31 
Title VII seeks to "make persons whole for injuries [ of 
an economic character] suffered on account of unlawful 
employment discrimination." Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). However, ordering that 
an employee be transformed into a partner, rather than 
reinstated as an employee and reconsidered for partner-
ship, "catapult[s] [the employee] into a better position than 
[she] would have enjoyed in the absence of discrimination." 
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 234 (1982). More-
over, the "'general rule'" expressed in Albemarle that 
"'[t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, 
in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had 
not been committed,' " 422 U.S. at 418-19, is no more 
than the traditional rule of contract damages, 19 and the 
award of monetary relief fully redtesses any "economic 
injury" caused by discriminatory conduct. See id. at 417-
19. 
The District Court seemed to feel that the size and 
diversity of Price Waterhouse diminished its interest in 
judicial selection of its partners. Findings, App. at 234-
35. However, the size of a particular partnership does not 
convert partners into employees. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 
273. Had Congress intended to create a definitional dis-
tinction based upon the number of partners in a firm, it 
undoubtedly would have done so expressly, as it did when 
it defined the term "employer" on the basis of the number 
of its employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
Finally, courts of equity historically have refused to de-
cree the creation of partnerships because of the necessarily 
personal relationship between co-owners of a joint business 
enterprise and the inherent difficulties of monitoring a 
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, 118 Cong. Rec. 7166, 7168 (1972); 
H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 2391, 2405 (section-by-section analysis). 
1• Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347 & comment a (1981) ("Con-
tract damages . . . are intended to give [the injured party] the benefit 
of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will, to the extent 
possible, put him in as good a position as he would have been in had 
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partnership decree. 20 Title VII should not be read to elim-
inate implicitly the common law prohibition against com-
pelling partnership in equity. See, e.g., Copel,and v. 
Martinez, 603 F.2d 981, 989 & n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980). 
B. The Court Should Interpret The Statute to Avoid 
Constitutional Infirmities 
Even if this Court were to be persuaded that Title VII 
could be construed to authorize the judicial creation of 
partnerships, the Court should avoid such a construction 
because it would raise serious constitutional questions un-
der the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is a " 'well-
established principle that statutes will be interpreted to 
avoid constitutional difficulties.' " Webster v. Re-productive 
Health Services, 109 S. Ct 3040, 3054 (1989). 
As Justice Powell recognized in Hishon, "impediments 
to the exercise of one's right to choose one's associates 
can violate the right of freedom of association protected 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 467 U.S. at 
80 n.4. Indeed, the Supreme Court "has long recognized 
that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure in-
dividual liberty, it must afford the formation and preser-
vation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a 
substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified inter-
ference by the State." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); Board of Directors of Rotary 
20 See, e.g., Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 
668-69 (1st Cir. 1984) ("few principles are more fundamental to our 
jurisprudence than the general prohibition against specific performance 
of personal service contracts . . . and there is a strong presumption 
against specific performance of a .. . partnership"). Accord Karrick v. 
Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 335 (1897) (a court "will seldom, if ever, 
specifically compel . . . performance of a [partnership contract], the 
contract of partnership being of an essentially personal character"); 
Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 550-51 
(1937) ("Equity will not decree the execution of· a partnership agree-
ment since it cannot compel the parties to remain partners"); Hyer v. 
Richmond Traction Co., 168 U.S. 471, 482 (1897) ("it would seem like 
a contradiction to force antagonistic parties to fo~ a partnership"). 
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,. ~ :" ... 
·_ -~_> ·-~. 
··- ·~ -
33 
Club, International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 545 
(1987) ("freedom to enter into and carry on certain inti-
mate or private relationships is a fundamental element of 
the liberty protected by the Bill of Rights"). The Court 
also has "recognized that the right to engage in activities 
protected by the First Amendment implies 'a correspond-
ing right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide 
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, 
and cultural ends.' " Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548. 
These two closely related aspects of associational free-
dom-freedom of intimate association and freedom of ex-
pressive association, respectively-are both implicated 
directly by the District Court's partnership decree: "There 
can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal 
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that 
forces the group to accept members it does not desire." 
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. 
Professional partnerships, which, like Price Waterhouse, 
are highly selective, personal, and intimate, are entitled 
to consideration under constitutional protections from un-
due governmental intrusion. 21 The choice of a partner is 
far more personal and permanent a commitment than the 
"choice of one's fellow employees," Roberts, 468 U.S. at 
620, and an interpretation of Title VII that treats as in-
21 The size of a partnership does not, in and of itself dissipate these 
qualities. The District Court found that Price Waterhouse had consist-
ently striven "to maintain the traditional characteristics of a profes-
sional partnership." 618 F. Supp. at 1111. Moreover, a partner need 
not know intimately every one of his or her partners to share common 
goals, risks, standards, ambitions and loyalties. Price Waterhouse part-
ners consider partner status to have an intrinsic special value quite 
apart from any purely commercial concerns. E.g., App. at 169 (the 
Senior Partner of the firm would never "demean his partners to a 
senior manager. He holds that bond too high."); id. at 130. The District 
Court's position that Price Waterhouse "lacks the intimacy and inter-
dependence of smaller concerns, so concerns about freedom of associ-
ation have little force," Findings, App. at 235, suggests incorrectly 
that members of large organizations are ineligible for protection of 
their associational freedoms. That is not the law. Cf NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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terchangeable the creation of partnerships and the rela-tionship between employers and employees calls into ques-tion the constitutional validity of the statute's remedial provisions. The text of Title VII unambiguously "admits of a less problematic construction." Public Citizen v. De-partment of Justice, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2567 (1989). This Court should adopt it to avoid these serious constitutional difficulties. 
IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING PARTNERSHIP IN THIS CASE 
Even if it had the authority to do so in an appropriate case, the District Court committed reversible error when it ordered Price Waterhouse to admit plaintiff as a partner under the peculiar facts of this case. The court created a "strained partnership relationship," Findings, App. at 237, based upon the "ill-defined" theory of sex stereotyping, id. at 249, despite evidence from most of the partners who evaluated plaintiff that she did not pass a legitimate Price Waterhouse criterion for partnership, and notwithstanding that her own "unreasonable intentional" conduct deprived her of "any possibility" of making partner when she was given a fair and unbiased opportunity to make partner. Id. at 240-41. Ordering a partnership under such circum-stances cannot reasonably be characterized as an appro-priate exercise of equitable discretion under Title VII, even if the statute authorizes such relief. 
It would be particularly inappropriate to force Price Waterhouse partners to accept into a professional and col-legial partnership someone who suffered from an "[i]nability to get along with staff or peers." 618 F. Supp. at 1114. Indeed, the courts often refuse to order rein-statement in cases in which, due to interpersonal dynamics, that remedy will result in disruption of sensitive relation-ships, friction, or antagonism. 22 
.,, See, e.g., Cassino v. Reichlwld Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1347 
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Plaintiff abused and subverted her legitimate opportu-
nity to make partner by engaging in counter-productive 
and self-destructive conduct. It would be ironic and unjust 
for the courts to create for her the remedy that her own 
conduct placed beyond her reach. Moreover, her deliberate 
refusal to seek employment that would have led to a com-
parable partnership in another firm also disqualifies her 
from seeking from the courts that which she could have 
obtained on her own had she not violated her legal duty 
to mitigate her damages. 
V 
PLAINTIFF'S RELIEF, IF ANY, MUST BE LIMITED 
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND BACK PAY FOR 
A LIMITED PERIOD 
If this Court determines that Price Waterhouse is liable, 
but agrees that plaintiff is not entitled to a Price Water-
house partnership, plaintiff's relief must be limited to 
attorney's fees and back pay for a limited period. Plaintiff 
had a legal duty to mitigate her damages. She failed even 
to make the slightest effort to obtain a position among 
the plethora of comparable opportunities available to her. 
She did not do any of the things that the law would have 
required. Therefore, her monetary relief must be limited 
to back pay for the period between the time of the deferral 
of her partnership candidacy and when she could have 
attained a similar position had she made reasonable efforts 
to do so. See Sangster v. United AirLines, Inc., 633 F.2d 
864, 868 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981) 
(failure to mitigate cuts off right to back pay). 
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047 (1988); McIntosh v. JC>'MS 
Truck Lines, Inc., 767 F.2d 433, 435 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. 
Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976)(refusing to reinstate executive beeause the position required a 
"close working relationship between plaintiff and top executives of 
defendant"), affd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 920 (1977); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rejecting reinstatement 
of executive because, "a person in an executive or management position 
must have the complete confidence of others in management"). 
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Plaintiff's refusal to make reasonable efforts to mitigate 
her damages forecloses the availability of "front pay" to 
compensate for any future losses. Dominic v. Consolidated 
Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1257-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (failure 
to mitigate precludes the availability of front pay); Han-
sard v. Pepsi Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 
1461, 1470 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 129 (1989). 
"[F]ront pay is intended to be temporary in nature," Cas-
sino, 817 F.2d at 1347, and "the plaintiff's duty to miti-
gate [damages] must serve as a control on front pay 
damage awards." Id. Plaintiff's relief, if any, should be 
restricted to damages for the period ending when she 
would have made partner at Price Waterhouse had she 
not made that impossible or, at most, for the two or three 
years that it would have taken her to make partner or 
attain the equivalent position at another firm. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's conduct as a Price Waterhouse employee, in-
cluding her propensity to abuse authority and intimidate 
subordinates, standing alone, would have resulted in a de-
cision to defer her partnership candidacy in 1983. Price 
Waterhouse has invariably denied or deferred partnership 
for men and women under these circumstances. Therefore, 
the judgment of liability against Price Waterhouse should 
be reversed. However, if the Court does find that Price 
Waterhouse is liable to plaintiff, she is not entitled under 
the law or the facts of this case to a partnership and she 
should recover no more than back pay for the period be-
tween the time of the deferral of her partnership candidacy 
and the date when she could have become a partner had 
she not prevented it by her own conduct or attained a 
position similar to a Price Waterhouse partnership had she 
taken reasonable steps to do so. 
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